Arsene Wenger’s belated decision to spend big, in January of all times, offers perhaps the starkest warning of the crisis Arsenal are currently in. Their two best players are on the verge of leaving on the cheap, they are losing touch with the top-four battle and a style of play that was once the benchmark for others to copy has eroded to the point of being almost completely unrecognisable. The prospective double arrival of Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang and Henrikh Mkhitaryan may be seen as a long-awaited statement of ambition, but in truth it reeks more of desperation.

Since Wenger signed his contract extension in the summer, much work has gone on behind-the-scenes to put in place a structure that will allow the club to operate once their cult-like leader has left. They raided Borussia Dortmund for new head of recruitment Sven Mislintat, took Raul Sanellehi from Barcelona as head of football relations and poached Huss Fahmy from Team Sky to negotiate contracts. Yet everything still feels incredibly messy.

The gamble not to sell either Alexis Sanchez or Mesut Ozil six months ago has backfired, with neither player convinced to remain at the club as their hopes of silverware have faded faster than ever. Even the belief that the Chilean’s inherent will to win would prevent his performances – and motivation – from dipping was misplaced. Instead, Sanchez’s still throbbing desire to leave alienated his teammates and caused tension within the dressing room.

Now Arsenal are attempting to undo their error in the space of just a single month that is notorious for being a difficult time to do business – not least in a World Cup year. Transfers are being driven by Mislintat, with the links to his old club Dortmund obvious, and Wenger seems apart from the decision-making process. New signing Konstantinos Mavropanos, for example, was expected to be immediately loaned out, but impressed so much in his first few training sessions that Wenger changed his mind.

With Aubameyang, similarly, Wenger expressed concern about the striker’s behaviour and attitude after he was suspended twice by Dortmund this season, but Mislintat stepped in to give a positive character reference. But perhaps he should have been more concerned about how Aubameyang – and, indeed, Mkhitaryan too – actually fit into this Arsenal team.

After starting as a pace-reliant frontman prime for counter-attacking in Jurgen Klopp’s heavy metal Dortmund side, he was pushed through the middle after Robert Lewandowski’s departure before maturing into a supreme poacher under Thomas Tuchel. The younger German’s more methodical, Guardiola-esque style focused on creating higher quality chances, and Aubameyang was always there to finish them off.

Last season, en route to the Bundesliga Golden Boot, the Gabon striker’s Expected Goals per shot was a frankly ridiculous 0.23, the most in Europe’s top five leagues. For comparison, Harry Kane, the Premier League’s leading scorer, hovers around 0.13 – in effect, every shot Aubameyang took was twice as likely to go in as those of Kane. But the crucial question when weighing up the impact he might have at the Emirates is whether his scoring record is the result of inspired finishing or excellent chance creation.

It is undoubtedly a bit of both, but while Aubameyang has ice in his veins in front of goal, he is helped by playing in one of the most creative teams in Europe. He rarely makes goals for himself out of nothing, while even the lightening pace he is famous for – he once claimed to have run 30 metres faster than Usain Bolt – is often left in reserve these days. Take the 13 Bundesliga goals he has scored this season: Six have been within the six-yard box, three were penalties and none were from outside the box – in fact, you have to go back to November 2013 for his last long-range goal.

Breakdown of Aubameyang's 2017/18 Bundesliga goals

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Aubameyang has certainly matured into a well-rounded frontman, but he profits most from a consistent supply of incredibly high-quality chances, predominantly feasting on square balls and low crosses. But while Dortmund have a coruscating and, crucially, coherent attack, Arsenal’s is inconsistent and often devoid of ideas. He’s also not unlike a certain club-record signing, Alexandre Lacazette, which only adds to the sense of confusion over spending even more money on a near identical player.

Perhaps the club feel they can complement each other, or maybe Aubameyang is being considered for a tweaked role on the wing despite having struggled there in his early days under Klopp. Or it could even be a concession on Wenger’s part that Lacazette – a player he watched for years without ever being entirely convinced he was worth spending big on – does not have the physicality and power needed for the Premier League, or the cunning to unsettle the many deep and defensive teams in the division.

Either way, Aubameyang’s arrival does not fix Arsenal’s problems. Their issues are rooted in an imbalanced midfield, a lack of good chance creation and a fragile mentality, while the striker himself is only as effective as the attack he plays in. The idea that Mkhitaryan – so out of form he has been valued the same as a player who will cost nothing in six months – could be the solution only adds more weight to the sense that manager and recruitment team are not on the same wavelength.

Mkhitaryan is at his most dynamic and dangerous on the counter-press; he’s not so much an unlocker of defences as someone who finds an open window round the back – but that’s not the way Arsenal play. Moreover, the Armenian has not recorded an assist in the league since August (he’s played 686 minutes since then) and even at Dortmund his relationship with Aubameyang was never as strong as some of his teammates. In their three seasons together, it was Lewandowski, Shinji Kagawa (master of the assist before the assist) and Gonzalo Castro that laid on the most goals for the striker. Ousmane Dembele assisted more of Aubameyang’s goals in one season than Mkhitaryan did in three.

It likely leaves Arsenal’s attack still massively reliant on the creativity of Ozil, and creates a mishmash of styles. The Gunners will own a pair of Dortmund alumni who are coming to the end of their peak years and whose instincts are to play at a far quicker tempo than a prosaic Arsenal side appear capable of, while they will also own two strikingly similar forwards who prefer leading the line on their own.

At the start of the season, Ivan Gazidis cited Dortmund – and other clubs notorious for punching above their weight – as his inspiration for Arsenal’s structural overhaul. But BVB and others have profited from both signing young players about to enter their prime and those ready-made for the club’s long-ingrained philosophy. But the Gunners have done neither, and in their hasty attempts to Dortmund-ise themselves, they forget the most important thing: Wenger is no Klopp or Tuchel, and the club’s broader quest for modernity and identity feels muddled by a manager still clinging to the past.